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INTRODUCTION
The New Economics got off to a slow start after
Keynes wrote the "General Theory , "

The public and the

ad.m1n1strations held to the old classical approach of
using monetary policies to stabilize the economy and
bring about full employment and economic growth ,
The Truman Ad.ministration began in the hottest
point of World War II.
employment,

The country was enjoying full

His Employment Act of 1946 1s considered

the Magna Carta of the new economics in action.

His

ad.m1nistration was characterized by inflation. and the
latter part by the Korean Conflict.
The Eisenhower Administration used more of the classical approach in an attempt to solve the problems of
economic stability.

His administration used monetary

policies which caused many ups and downs of the business
cycle,

This instability was caused by the ad.ministration •s

attempt to balance the budget.
The dynamics of the Neo- Keynesian Economics came with
the beginning of the Kennedy and Johnson Ad.ministrations .
These two administrations were dominated by fiscal policies

vi
with more emphasis on full employment, stable prices,
and economic growth than on balancing the budget.
This paper 1s a comparative study of the old class ical philosophy which was used during the Eisenhower
Administration, with the new economics philosophy of
the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Administrations, in
attempting to solve the problems of full employment,
stable prices, and economic growth.
The scope is limited to the Democratic and Republican
Administrations since World War II.
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CHAPTER I
THE NEC-KEYNESIAN THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT
John Maynard Keynes attacked one of the fundamental assumptions underlying orthodox theory since the
days of Ricardo, in which was stated,
its own demand."

11

Supply creates

The orthodox theory was based on the

principle that constitutes the means of payment for
commodities is simple commodities; from which it follows
that money makes no difference except frictionally, that
consumption 1s limited by production, and oversupply is
impossible.

According to P1gou. unemployment 1s due to

the effect or fact that frictional resistances prevent
the appropriate wage adjustment from being made instantaneously.

In place of this, Keynes sought a monetary

theory of production according to which unemployment may
be due, not to labors' refusal to accept a lower reward,
but to a deficiency of "effective demand."
The basic change was a clear recognition that the
thing to be studied was the forces which determine the

2

total volume of output and employment, rather than the
various price levels.
two stages,

In effect, the process works in

an increase in investment leads to higher

prices being realized for an unchanged output of consumption goods, and the resUl.t1ng windfall profits then
provide an inducement for management to expand output.l
Keynes condemned the notion that money is a mere counter
which can exert at the most a transitory influence on
"real" things like ou.tput and employment. 2
Pigou, being a classical economist, stated that
there will be full employment when the supply of labor
equals to the demand for labor.

In his theory of un-

employment, he concluded that there will always be at
work a strong tendency for wage rates to be so related
to demand that everyone will be employed.
Keynes said that this automacy does not work.
I

Some people are involuntarily unemployed.

To Keynes,

there will be full employment when the number of persons
seeking employment are employed, minus frictional
unemployment.

1Robert Lekachman, Robert Keynes' General Theory1
Report of Three Decades (New York1 MacMillan and
Company, Ltd., 1964), pp. 99-lOJ,
2 Ibid.

J
According to Keynes , the classical theory of employment is based on two fundamental principles.

The

first 1s that wages are equal to the marginal product
of labor , and the second is that the utility of the wage ,
when a given volume of labor is employed, 1s equal to
the marginal diutility of that amount of employment.
Of these two postulates, the first gives the demand
schedule , for employment, and the second deals with the
supply schedule.

The amount of employment is fixed at

the point where the utility of the margin produced
balanced the d1sut1lity of the marginal employment.
These postulates are compatible with what may be
called frictional or voluntary unemployment.

Fric-

tional unemployment allows for various exactnesses of
adjustment which stand in the way of continuous full
employment ,

It is unemployment due to the time lags

consequent or foreseen changes, or it is due to the
fact that the change-over from one employment to another
cannot be effective without a certain delay,

Voluntary

unemployment is due to the refusal of the unit of labor,
as a result of lagislation, slow response to changes,
or mere human obstinacy, to accept a reward corresponding

4

to the value o.f the produot attributed to 1 ts marginal product1vity.3
I.

DEMAND UNEMPLOYMENT

The demand for labor 1s derived from the demand
for other goods and serv1ce .s wh1ch labor participates
in producing,

Thus, unemployment will be reduced to

four per cent of the labor force only when the demand
f .o r the myriad of goods and services ls large enough
to require the productive efforts of 96 per cent of

the ci vl.lian labor force.
Although many goods are 1n1t1ally produced as material for the further product1on of the other goods,
all goods are Ultimately destined to satisfy demand that
can be classified into four categortes1

consumer demand,

business demand for new plants and lllach1nery, and for
additional inventories, net export demand of foreign
buyers., and demand for g,overnm.e nt units.

The gross

national product is the sum of four major components of
expend1 tu.res: . pers1onal consumption expend1 ture I gross

private domestic investment, net export, and government

JJohn Maynard Keynes, The General Theory (New York,
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936), pp. 4-22.

5
purchase of goods and services.

The primary 11ne of

attack on the problem of unemployment must be through
measures which will expand one or more of these components of demand.

II.

STRUCTURAL UNEMPLOYMENT

Even though an increase in demand must be the
major line of attack on unemployment , other measures
are needed as well .

Some workers are unemployed be-

cause they are not properly trained.

Some are unem-

ployed because they are geographically separated from
the places where jobs are opening and they are unaware
of the existence of such opportunities ,

As a result

of insui'fic1ent geographic and occupational mobility,
bottlenecks and shortages of particular types of labor
may occur as job opportunities expand at a time when
there are still many unemployed workers.
The displacement of labor through changes 1n technology , consumer tastes , and geographic distributions
of industry are inevitable parts of the growth of a
free and progressive economy.

But the level of unem-

ployment corresponding to any given pace or rate of
progress depends on the smoothness with which markets

6

function.

The size of the pool of unemployed workers

1s determined jointly by the flow of workers into 1t
and the flow out of it.

The flow into it depends upon

the rate at which workers enter the labor force without jobs.

The flow out depends on the speed at which

the unemployed can transfer to jobs being vacated by
retirement, and to other skills, other industries, and
other areas where jobs are available in expanding sectors of the economy. 4
Economic policies can reduce the size of the pool
by providing opportunities for vocational training and
re-training, by improving the flow of information about
job opportunities, by facilitating the relocation of
displaced workers, by acting to reduce and eliminate
the discriminatory hiring practices, and by assisting
in the rehabilitation of depressed areas through the
renovation of public facilities and the attraction of
hirable industr1es.5

4 Ibid.

5Econom1c Report of the President, 1963,

CHAPTER II
THE NEW ECONOMICS AND THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION
Harry

s.

Truman was elected Vice- President to

Franklin D. Roosevelt i n 1945.

He became president

after Roosevelt ' s death on April 12, 1945.

His im-

mediate goals were to carry out the former president ' s
plans .
With the exception of Abraham Lincoln and Franklin

D. Roosevelt , no president took office in a gr eater
period of crisis than President Truman.

He took office

during the time America was in the heat of World War II .

I.

THE FAIR DEAL PROGRAMS
AFTER THE WAR

After the four years of war, the industrial potential of the Upited States was at an all- time high.

An

advertible revolution took place in the country during
the war.

The number of persons in the labor force in-

creased sharply because mill ions of women and farmers

8

went to work 1n war plants and factories.

Technical

skills had improved accordingly, because of the complexities and exacting standards required in producing
implements of war.

In addition, animosities toward

minority groups had slackened since Pearl Harbor and a
push in this direction was advocated to prevent backsliding.

Millions of GI's were returning and if the

minorities did not find opportunities for employment,
education and housing, their vision of the danger of
this disillusionment would become a reality. 6

Truman was determined that the economy must not
crumble at this crucial time.

He did not want the

economy to run into pre-war "normalcy" again with
ten million unemployed in 1940.

Economists had

al-

ready warned Roosevelt that unemployment would reach
eight million at the end of the war.

In Truman's message to Congress in September, 1945,
he asked for an economic "Bill of Rightslt which included the right to a job at fair pay, the right of
every family to a decent home and adequate medical care,
the right to a good education, and the right of

6Alfred Steinberg, The Man from Missouri (New York1
G. P. Putman's Sons, 1962), pp. 27-JO.

9

businessmen to trade in an atmosphere not polluted by
unfa1r competition and monopoly.

The implementation

of these rights called for Truman's asking for a Full
Entployment Act, increased minimum wages, extended unemployment compensation for those not covered by law,
increased farm price support, a national health program,
aid to education, and a permanent Fair Employment
Practice Committee to provide equal job opportunities
regardless of race or religion.7

II.

THE EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1946

The Employment Act of 1946 held by Professor Alvin
Hansen as the Magna Carta of economic planning, marked
the official projection of the belief in the automaticity of the economic system which was the philosophy of
the classical economist.

In addition to pledging to

avoid depression and inflation, the act provided for a
Council of Economic Advisors of the President.

The

Council's function was to advise the government on appropriate economic policies to achieve full employment,
economic gro,th and stable prices.

These professional

10

economists wou1d not have been able to advise presidents before the Truman Administration because of the
classical system which advocated laissez faire or no
governmental intervention in business affairs. 8
Section 2 of the Employment Act of 1946 states
that,
The Congress hereby declares that it is the
continuing policy and responsibility of the
federal government to use practicable means
consistent with its needs and obligations and
other essential considerations of national
policy, with the assistance and cooperation
of industry, agriculture, labor and state and
local functions, in a manner calculated to
foster and promote free and competitive enterprise and general welfare, self-employment,
production and purchasing power.
Although the term

full employment' was not in-

cluded, the act marked a new era in the national policy.
The government's initiation and implementation of specific programs that would bring about high levels of employment were complexed, though the act gave wide scope
to whatever programs might seem feasible, it did not
set up a specific procedure to insure examination to unemployment and its remedies by both the President and

8Alv1n H. Hansen, Business Cycle and National
Income (New Yorks w. w. Norton and Company, Inc.,

1964).

11

Congress.

The President is required to submit to

Congress at the beginning of each regular session an
economic report which analyzes past and current
economic trends with Section 2 of the Act and recommended policies for legislative action that he feels would
best promote the level.9

III.

THE PROBLEMS OF INFLATION

Immediately following the lar in 1946, there was
a sharp increase in the general price level.

The whole-

sale prices rose by fifty per cent from 1945-1948.

This

rise was caused by the war which caused a shortage in
consumer goods.

There was a monetary savings that had

been accumulated in the hands of both consumers and
business firms. 10 Once price control was removed, prices
rose sharply.

The inflationary upsurge lasted nine

months and then slowed down.
inflation was all over.

At the end of 1947, the

In fact, during the last month

of 1948, the price level was below that of January, 1948,

12

And. two years later, the average index of wholesale
prices for the year 1950, stood one per cent lower
than the average for 1948.
In mid-summer, 1950, the Korean War broke out.
All over lestern Europe and the United States,prices
rose to about fifteen per cent 1n nine months. 11

13

TABLE I
SHOWING G. N. P., PRICE INDEX, LABOR FORCE, AND
BATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT DURING
TRUMAN'S ADMINISTRATION
{January , 1945 - January, 1953)

Civ,

Ret .

Yr. !2,

47
48

49

50

51
52

GNP

211.9
257,6

256.5

284.8
.328.4
345 .5

Price
Index

Wholesale

77.8
83,8
83,0
8J.8
86.8
96.7

81.2
87.9

BJ,5

86,8
96,7
94.o

Lab,

Force

59,.350
60,620
61,289
62,208
62,017
62,188

In Billions (1957-59=100)
GNP - ~holesale

45
46

231.2
208.5

62.7
68.o

57.9

66,1

53,860
57,520

Tot.

Tot.
Unem,

Unem.
Rate

57,059

2,311
2,266
3,367
3,288

J.9
J.8

Em,

58,344
.57,649

58,520

.59,962
60,254

2,055

1,883

5.9
5.3

J.4
3,0

In Thousands (14 yrs.
above) - Civ. Lab.
Force - Unem. Rate.

52,820

55,250

1,040
2,270

1.9
J.9

Compiled from Tables B2 , B20, B42, and B45 in The Economic
Report of the President (1969), p. 252.

CHAPTER III
THE NEW ECONOMICS AND THE EISENHOWER
ADMINISTRATION
I,

PROBLEMS OF UNEMPLOYT:-1ENT

During the eight years of the Eisenhower Adm1n1-

stration, unemployment was less than four per cent
only 1n 1953,

This was a period heavily influenced

by the requirements of the Korean Conflict,

The

business cycle seems to have carried with 1t a higher
rate of employment.

July, 1953, was the peak of the

business expansion which began in November, 1949.

Dur-

ing the forty-f1 v,e months of upward movements of the

business activities,. unemployment was less than f1 ve

per cent in less than forty-two months.

July, 1953,

unemployment had fallen to 2. 7 per cent of the la.b ar
force. 12

The price level seems to have fluctuated along with
the employment rates.

An increase in the demand for

12Robert Leckachman, The Age of Keynes (New York1
Ba.ndom House, 1956).

15
labor shortages, wages tend to rise faster.

There is

no universally accepted measure indicating the amount
of wage and price increase that corresponds to each
level of demand for labor or how much unemployment is
likely to be associated with a particular increase in
wage, 13
During the period of the third quarter of 1953,
the employment level was very high and the prices were
stable for the first time in history.

The Gross

National Product increased from $,348 billion in 1952
to $367 billion in 1953, which was an increase of
per cent,

5.5

14

In Eisenhower's attempt to stretch out defense
procurement and cut back non-defense spending, he
caused a cut in the government orders and expenditures
which turns out to be a major factor causing a recession
1n the latter part of 1953,

The unemployment rate

jumped to 5,8 per cent of the labor force,

The total

number of jobless persons rose to more than 3,750,000.
In January, 19.54, Congress stepped in to ease the
deflationary pressure by dropping the income tax rate

lJibid,
14The Economic Report of the President , 1969, pp,

252-253.

16
by ten per cent.

At the same time, the Federal Reserve

System went to work on monetary policies to put money
back into circulation.

Through the use of these fiscal

and monetary policies, the business cycle made an upward turn toward prosperity in the second half of 1954,
which lasted until the summer of 1957.

The recession

advanced rapidly and resulted in higher levels of unemployment than 1n 1953.
During the upswing of 1958 to 1960, the unemployment rate which averaged a little more than four per
cent, previously, averaged

5.5 per cent in 1960.

average family income in 1960 was

The

6,520, which is 15

per cent in 1959, and 5 per cent higher than the real
income of 1952. 15
II.

THE -USE OF MONETARY AND FISCAL

POLICIES TO STABILIZE
THE ECONOMY

Eisenhower took office during the boom periods of
the Korean

ar.

Bis administration relied upon monetary

15counc11 of Economic Advisors, The orkings of the
Multiplier (New York, w. . Norton and Company, 1960),

17
policies to stabilize the economy.

Inflation was high

1n April, 1953, when the Secretary of Treasury moved
to tighten credit through the use of long-term loans
which soaked up money. 16

The initial tightening pro-

cess was so effective that within two months, it brought
about a dangerous scramble for cash.

The administration

recognized that the move had turned the inflation into
deflation.

The treasury along with the Federal Reserve

System took steps to ease credit and put money into
circulation.
The Council of ·Economic Advisors recommended more
monetary policies and less government expenditures.
They thought more in terms of the activities of private
businesses and tax reduction than particular operations
undertaken by the government itself.
The Federal Reserve System moved quickly and decisively.

The System's action to ease credit conditions

through open market operations led to a rapid expansion
of commercial bank loans, investments, and bank time
deposits which were powerfully assisted by the underlying strength of demand.

These measures helped to turn

the cycle upward in the second half of 19.54.

18
The end of the cyclical expansion and boom that
began around the middle of

of 1957.

1954, came 1n the summer

The rise in production and other factors had

become moderately stable by 1956 and 1957.

The

Federal Reserve System continued to tighten money to
curb inflationary pressure.

The timing of the last

tightening action, raising the discount rate by one-

half percentage point to 3 1/2 per cent in the summer
of 1957, turned out to set the boom into a recession.
The downturn was brief but sharp.

During the

period of time from the summer of 1957 to the winter
of 1958, the Gross National Product fell by nine per
cent,

In an effort to reverse the decline, the Federal

Reserve System took action to ease credit conditlons. 1 7
The discount rate was reduced by one-half point in the
fall of 1957, and other reductions were made in rapid
order 1n 1958.

Member banks found themselves with

enough reserve funds to reduce their debts to the

Federal Reserve Banks and to restore, in some degree,
their reduced liquidity.

As the Reserve positions

1 7The Board of Governors, Federal Reserve ~stem
Monetary Policies (Washington, D. C. 1 O'nited S tes
Department of the Treasury, 1960),

19
continued to be eased through open market operations
and reduced reserve requirements, bank credit became
readily available and the money supply, after declining in the latter part of 1957, rose rather rapidly
in 1958. 18

18fil.!!.

,

p. 10 6 •

20
TABLE II

SHOT I G G. N. P., PRICE INDEX, LABOR FORCE, AND
RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT DURING
EISENHO '1ER' S ADMINISTRATION
(January, 19 5.3 - January, 19 61)

Year

1953

1954

1955

1956
1957
1958
1959
1960

GNP

*
364,6
J64.8
419.2
441.1
441.1
447.J
48J,7
503. 7

Bet

Price
Index

*
93.2

93 ,6
93 .J
94,7
98 .o
100 .7
101,5
lOJ.l

•Tholesale

*

92.7
92,9
93,2
96,2
99,0
100,4
100,6
100,7

C1v,

Lab.
Force

**
63,015
6J,64J
65,023

66,552

66,929
67,639
68,369
69,628

Tot.
Em.

Tot .
Unem,

*ii-

**
61,181 1,834

60,110
62,171
63,802
64,071
63,036
64,630
65,778

3,532
2,852

2,750

2,859
4,602
3,740
J,852

Une •
Rate

**
2,9
5.5

4,4
4.1
4.J
6,8
5,5
5,5

Compiled from Tables B2, B20, B42, and B45 1n The Economic
Renert of the President (1969), p, 252,

* In B1111ons (1957-59=100)

~

In Thousands (16 years old and above)

CHAPTER IV
THE NEW ECONOMICS AND THE KENNEDY
ADMINISTRATION
In 1961, with over five million people unemployed
and a production gap of nearly $50 billion , the problem of the Council of Economic Advisors was not what
to do , but how to get the people to listen.

The power

of the new economics could not be easily harnessed to
the lagging economy without conditioning the public
to fit the new ideas , new thin.king, and broader concept of public interest.
Before 1960, the policy- thinking had been centered
more on minimizing the fluctuations of the business
cycle than on the realization of the economy's great
and growing potentials .

Authur Bu.ms stated that the

American people , lately , have been more conscious of
the business cycle , and more alert to the possibility
of more for contracyclical actions on the part of the
government, than ever before in history.

22
President Kennedy ' s ad.m.1n1strat1on inherited a
recession which began
the spring of 1961,

late 1960 and was over by

The Gross National Product , at

the same time , fell only
rate.

2.5 per cent at an annual

The unemployment rate hit a high of 6 per cent

of the labor force .

From the winter of 1962 to 196J ,

the Real Gross National Product rose steadily.

Al-

though there was a steady rise 1n the Gross National
Product , the unemployment rate did not go below

5. 5

per cent of the labor force in almost three years of
expansion.

The college- trained and skilled laborers

were only a fractional part of the total unemployment, 1 9
l,

THE PROBLEMS OF UNEMPLOYMENT

President Kennedy was the first President of the
United States to enter the White Rouse with the new
economics philosophy,

He was deeply committed to more

rapid growth as an instrument for the common good , and
eager to put the power of modern economics to wor~ to
help achieve the national goals.

The major causes of

l9James Tabin . The Fox- Cut Harvest (New York,
W. Norton , Inc, , 1965).

W.

23
skilled unemployment were locational, color and age.
Although, the total unemployment rate averaged 5.5
per cent, the rate for unemployed non-whites was 11
per cent, the predominantly unskilled labor where
discrimination was heavily practiced, was high. 20
To curb this high rate 1 and the discrimination
that went along with it in unemployment, Kennedy recommended several programs to be initiated.
effective

The most

eapon for dealing with these problems was

the Organization of Economic Opportunity.

Under this

organization, the Manpower Training Program proved very
effective in training workers for special skills to
meet the need of both the government and industry.

The

Manpower Program had three major component parts, the
Job Corps, the Youth Corps, and On-the-Job-Traintng. 21

II.

THE FISCAL AND MONETARY TOOLS USED IN
STABILIZING THE ECONOMY

The search for ways and means to build a firm base
of price-cost stability for expansion began in 1961.
20

ialter • Heller, The New Dimensions of Political Economy (New York,
• Norton, Inc,, 1965).

21~.

24
It began long before massive stimulants to demand were
proposed.

The first line of defense against deflation

had been provided by the legacy of price stability
that grew out of the restrictive monetary-fiscal policies, economic slack, high unemployment and slow
growth which started in 1960. 22
The hard task was to maintain stability while
stimulating the economy. taking up the slack, restoring full employment and doubling the rate of growth.

To accomplish these goals, several innovations in the
economy were made.
The most important among the measures to speed the
advances of productivity was a

3 million tax incentive

to invest in plants and equ1pment recommended in April.

1961, and put into effect in 1965.

The measures to

stimulate physical investment in human beings,

The

Manpower Development and Training measures initiated
early in 1961, became the forerunner of a long line of
programs.

The program included aid to education and an

aid to finance the far on Poverty which as designed to

C.1

22Manpower Report of the President ( ·lashington, D.
United States Department of Labor, April, 196J).

25
to increase the skills, the quality, and the mobility
of the labor force.
Another 1961 innovation was the efforts to twist
the structure of interest rates so as to hold down the
cost of long-term funds for investment in new plants and
equipment while raising short-term rates to minimize
the out-flow of volatile funds to other countries.

The

successive increase in interest rates payable by commercial banks on time deposits played an important role
in re-directing the flow of funds from the short to the
long term of spectrum and, thus, serving the objectives
of the twist 1n the monetary policies. 23

2 3Ibid., pp. J74-J76.
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TABLE III
SRO lING G. N. P., PRICE INDEX, LABOR FORCE, AND
RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT DURING
KENNEDY'S ADMINISTRATION
(January, 1961 - January, 1964)

Year

Gp

*

Ret,
Price
Index

*

sale

C1v.
Lab.
Force

Tot,
Em.

Tot,
Unem,

Rate

*

*

**

**

**

Whole-

Unem,

1961

520.1

104.2

100.J

70,459

65,746

4,714

6.7

1962

560.J

105.4

100,6

70,614

66,702

J,911

1963

590.5

106.7

100.J

71,8)3

67,762

4,070

5.5
5,7

Compiled from Tables B2, B20, B42, and
5 in ?he Economic
Report of the President (1969), p. 252,
*In Billions (1957-59=100)
**In Thousands (16 years old and above)

CHAPTER V

THE NEW ECONOMICS AND THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION
President Jolmson was the second president to use
the new economics ideas as a guideline for his fiscal
measures.

After serving as Vice-President to John F,

Kennedy, Johnson moved his administration toward The
Great Society, extending beyond Kennedy's New Frontier.
The first part of the Johnson Ad.m1n1strat1on began
in 1963 , after the assassination of President Kennedy,
In 1964, Johnson's ad.ministration carried on all of the
new ideas of the Kennedy Adm1n1strat1on,

He not only

strengthened the programs which Kennedy advocated but
added new programs with great success.
After being educated in the new economics philosophy

along with Kennedy , Johnson made full use of the

New Economics in his policy recommendations to Congress.
The imprint of these ideas can be shown through his attempt to maintain stable prices, full employment and
economic growth. 24

24Heller, loc. cit,
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I.

EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS

The Johnson Administration was characterized by
a hi gh rate of employment.

There were several factors

contributing to this high employment rate.

The first

includes the enactment of a tax cut early 1n 1964, in
which the economy responded almost exactly in accord
with the economic analysis and projection on which it
it was founded.

25

It made good on both its economics

and budgetary promises.

The slow change that had been

work ing to raise public miderstanding of new economics
ideas gave way under the impact of the tax cut of 1964,
to a rapid change in public thinking and acception of
active fiscal policies. 26

A second incentive for full employment was the vast
amount of money spent for the War on Poverty.

The pur-

pose of which was to put those people who were unemployed to work 1n various skilled positions,

The money

spent for training these people, thus, stimulated the
economy, vastly.

25James Tabin, The Battle Against Unemployment (New
York, W, w. Norton and Company, 1965).
26 Ib1d,
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The third econom1o phenomenon which induced employment was the Viet Nam Har.

Thousands of men were

employed annually to meet the deman
tion of war products,.

for the produc-

Many of these men were taken

from the unemployment roster and trained with a skill
and placed on jobs 1n various factories.
At pre ,s ent , thel"e 1 s a labor s.hortage •

Ma es 1ve

efforts are being made to train personnel to meet the
need of both the government and private factories, as
well as industries.
II.

THE EFFECT OF OLD PROGRAMS INITIATED

In efforts to meet the needs of the Viet Nam War,
there has been a large manpower shortage of skilled
labor.

To meet this need and improve the education,

skills and productivity of the disadvantaged, President
Johnson expanded the

ar on Poverty to produce more

skilled workers,
Under the old program came the Job Corps, the
Youth Corps, On-the-Job-Training, and Aid to Higher
Education. 27

C.

I

2 7Manpower Riiort to the President { ash1ngton, D.
The United S tes Department of Labor, 1968).
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III .

THE FISCAL AND MONETARY TOOLS USED TO
STABILIZE THE ECONOMY

The Federal Reserve System used all of its tools
of re-discount rates, selling securities on the open
.market , and raising the reserve requirements of member
banKs 1n an attempt to stabilize the economy.

The

public , in general , did not respond to these monetary
weapons which caused them to be ineffective as a means
to stability.
The general public belief in the past two years has
been that prices are going to continue to rise because
of the Viet Nam War , and, therefore, the public continues to borrow from the banks and loan companies at
high interest rates.

The monetary system is now search-

ing for new ways to solve the high inflationary pressure that it attempted to solve during the Johnson
Administration.
The fiscal measure that the Johnson Ad.ministration
used in an attempt to curb high inflation that dominated
his regime was to raise the tax rate.

The rate of

taxes has been rising steadily to ease the inflationary

31
pressures and to stabilize the economy. 28

The last

tax measure was a sur-tax on income imposed in 1968.
The ten per cent sur-tax came too late and was ineffective in slowing the economy down.

The Johnson

Administration , dominated by high 1nflat1on, also
ended with high 1nflat1on. 29

28 Ib1d.

29L, R. Klein, The Keynesian Revolution ( ew Yorks
Mac illan, Inc., 1968).
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TABLE IV

sao· ING G. N. P., PRICE INDEX , LABOR FORCE , AND
RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT DURlliG

JOHNSON'S ADMINISTRATION

(January, 1964 - March, 1969)

Ret,

Year

*

GNP Price
Index

*

*

C1v.
Lab.

holesale

Force

Tot.
Em.

*

*

**

Tot,
Unem.

Unem.
Rate

**

**

1964

632,4 108.1 100.5

73,091

69,305

J,786

5.2

1965

684.9

109,9 102.5

74,455

71,088

3,366

4.5

1966

747,6 113,1 105,9

75,770

72,895

2,875

J.8

1967

789,7

116.3 106.1

77,349

74,372

2,975

J.8

1968

860.7 120,9 108.7

78,737

75,920

2,817

J.6

Compiled from Tables B2, B20, B42, and B45 in The Economic
Report of tne President (1969), p. 252.
*In Billions (1957-59=100)
**In Thousands (16 years and above)

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
According to the studies that have been made,
economists have come to the conclusion that monetary
policies do not work.

Monetary policies have been in-

effective on stabilizing the economy over a long period
of time and requires the growth rate to keep the economy expanding at the necessary rate of J per cent per
year .
The Truman Administration took office during a
period of prosperity which was caused by World War II .
Truman' s Employment Act of 1946 is considered the beginning of the Neo- Keynesian Economics in Action.
The Eisenhower Administration was characterized by
many ups and downs of the business cycle which caused

high unemployment rates and a slow growth rate for the
economy as a whole .

The monetary policies were

ineffective .

'

J4
The Kennedy and Johnson Ad.ministrations were a reversal in the policies in which Eisenhower used,

The

Kennedy- Johnson Ad.ministration used predominantly fiscal policies to stabilize and expand the economy.

The

new economics philosophy was very successful 1n maintaining full employment and expanding the economy .
It is the writer' s belief that the fiscal policies are best in achieving the goals of the economy,
since it has been proven that these measures have been
able to solve the provlems that monetary policies
failed to solve during previous administrations.
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